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Carlo Ancelotti's Milan, the last great diamond side? Photos: Getty Images; design: Eamonn Dalton/The Athletic This article is the final part of a wider series in partnership with Football Manager 26, which looks at the strengths and weaknesses of famous historical and contemporary tactics. For all the tactical flexibility in modern football, one previously common formation has almost completely disappeared from the sport in recent years: the midfield diamond. Advertisement That system, generally depicted as a 4-3-1-2 — sometimes a 4-1-3-2 in a slightly different format — is most commonly linked with Argentina and Italy, two countries that arguably revere the No 10 more than anyone but don’t produce many top wide players. That situation is chicken-and-egg, of course, and maybe the death of the diamond is not just about the system itself, but about what the system represents. After all, the 4-3-1-2, perhaps more than any other modern system — if it still qualifies for that tag — has obvious strengths and weaknesses. In simple terms, it packs the centre of the pitch, but leaves space out wide. In reality, the diamond, when used properly, can cover space dynamically. The width can come from the forwards running the channels, or from the shuttlers on either side of the diamond pushing out wide, or from the full-backs advancing. What initially appears to be a very rigid shape can be perfectly fluid. And, at its best, the diamond was used by managers who wanted control in midfield. Go back to the mid-2000s, for example, and you will find Jose Mourinho’s Porto side winning the European Cup with that system, while Carlo Ancelotti’s Milan were the most consistent diamond-fielding side. That Milan, in particular, showed how the diamond allows managers to load up on ball-playing midfielders. A midfield featuring Andrea Pirlo, Clarence Seedorf and Kaka, with Gennaro Gattuso doing most of the dirty work, was particularly bold during a period of cagey football. At times, Ancelotti went further and used Rui Costa instead of a second striker, turning the system into a 4-3-2-1 — the Christmas tree formation. That was a different system, but realistically, it offered similar qualities and similar drawbacks. At one stage, the diamond was the most popular formation in Serie A. Last season, it was only used a couple of times. What has happened? What seems to have killed the diamond is the pace and intensity of the modern game. The diamond could overcome most of its width-based shortcomings when the game was played at a slower tempo. The shuttlers on the sides of the midfield had freedom to push out wide and the full-backs could push forward on the outside. But in the modern game, with transitions so quick and devastating, that is asking for trouble, and inviting counter-attacks. Advertisement Teams can no longer rely upon full-backs to provide most of the attacking width down either flank, while also getting back to defend in a back four. It’s more viable in a 3-4-1-2, but even that system is relatively rare these days. Wing-backs generally prosper in a 3-4-3, when they’re overlapping and combining with a wide player who has drifted inside, or using the space that has been created by them dragging in the opposition full-back. Indeed, the reinvigoration of systems featuring wing-backs didn’t help the diamond, particularly in Italy. The rise of 3-4-3, partly inspired by Walter Mazzarri’s Napoli at the start of the 2010s, and the 3-5-2 used by Francesco Guidolin at Udinese, meant free-running wing-backs dominated the flanks, and teams could switch play easily between the outsides of an opposition diamond. The diamond also doesn’t work particularly well in an era based on pressing. There’s nothing particularly wrong with the diamond as a pressing shape of its own — the attacking midfielder can push forward to become an extra striker, and you’re pressing with a 4-3-3. Besides, the lateral compactness of the shape can actually be very effective at boxing opponents towards one flank and suffocating their attempts to play through the lines. But that same compactness can, equally, make it easy for pressing sides to overwhelm the diamond. The distances are short and easy for the opposition to cover. The passing lanes are simple to shut down. There’s no out-ball. The diamond means teams play their way into trouble. The diamond has rarely proved popular in England, which is curious considering it is effectively the system that brought England’s only World Cup triumph in 1966. Alf Ramsey’s jettisoning of natural wingers was both unconventional and controversial at the time, and made viable by different players on either flank. On the left, there was Ray Wilson, a mobile and speedy full-back who could contribute in attack, and on the right of the diamond, there was Alan Ball, part-midfielder, part-winger. Advertisement It was more 4-1-3-2 than 4-3-1-2, with Nobby Stiles remaining deep and allowing Ball and Martin Peters to push forward on either side of the star man, Bobby Charlton. Whereas diamond midfielders are often associated with possession control, England were adept at winning possession and then breaking quickly through the middle. England’s most notable experiment with the diamond since Ramsey was before Euro 2004, when Sven-Goran Eriksson attempted to solve England’s ongoing midfield conundrum by squashing a flat four into a diamond. At this point, it’s worth remembering, England’s midfielders were so different from the players they became half a decade later that Paul Scholes was considered the obvious choice as the No 10, while Frank Lampard was fielded in the holding role, with David Beckham and Steven Gerrard on the sides. On paper, it worked, but on the pitch, it fell flat, which often happens with the diamond. After a poor performance in a warm-up friendly against Japan, a 1-1 draw, the players asked Eriksson to switch back to their customary flat four. In Premier League history, the diamond has tended to be effective for title-chasing sides in very short, sharp bursts. Ancelotti started Chelsea’s 2009-10 title-winning campaign with the system and they looked unstoppable, before the side hit a brick wall in autumn as opponents exposed their lack of width. Ancelotti switched to 4-3-3, and Chelsea found their stride again. In Sir Alex Ferguson’s final season with Manchester United, 2012-13, he had a brief dalliance with the diamond, largely because he signed Shinji Kagawa to be Wayne Rooney’s partner, then pounced for Robin van Persie, and tried to fit all three in. It looked promising until Kagawa missed two months with a knee injury. United built without him, and won Ferguson’s final league title. Liverpool didn’t quite win the title in 2013-14, but their sensational burst in the spring which brought 11 straight victories owed much to Brendan Rodgers switching to a diamond, with a more experienced Gerrard playing the holding role well — at least until his fatal slip against Chelsea — with Jordan Henderson right, Philippe Coutinho left, and Raheem Sterling at the top, racing forward into attack to join Luis Suarez and Daniel Sturridge. These days, the diamond is probably more commonly seen between a back three and a front three — a 3-3-1-3, once an almost impossibly exotic idea, but now often seen as a side’s in-possession shape, particularly when a full-back is brought inside into the midfield zone. Advertisement And other systems do end up resembling a diamond, in different ways. Jurgen Klopp’s Liverpool, for example, used Roberto Firmino as a false nine, while Mohamed Salah and Sadio Mane were the main goalscorers from wide. Is this not effectively an example of a diamond? But the ‘true’ diamond is seemingly dead in the modern game. And while that’s sad for tactical variety, and for those who like classic No 10s, the diamond often looked better on paper than on the pitch. If you want to cram your best players into a team, it’s a great system — it’s notable how often it pops up when someone is asked to name their best-ever world XI — but if you want something cohesive and effective, it’s often underwhelming. There were few worse tactical battles than a diamond against a diamond — the players squashed into the centre of the pitch, the No 10 unable to find space, the forwards receiving little service and the only free players being the full-backs. For all the glory and romance of Argentine and Italian football, these are not divisions renowned for entertaining football. Still, history suggests that it can be effective as a surprise system, perhaps for a high-intensity spell. But sides in that system tend to get ‘worked out’ after a while, and managers never use the formation consistently these days. Diamonds, it seems, aren’t forever. This series is part of a partnership with Football Manager 26. The Athletic maintains full editorial independence. Partners have no control over or input into the reporting or editing process and do not review stories before publication. Spot the pattern. Connect the terms Find the hidden link between sports terms Play today's puzzle Michael Cox concentrates on tactical analysis. He is the author of two books - The Mixer, about the tactical evolution of the Premier League, and Zonal Marking, about footballing philosophies across Europe. Follow Michael on Twitter @Zonal_Marking